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TRADE, LABOR, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR MEXICAN LABOR
ARISING FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Louise D. Williams*
"Trade, we insist, must be an instrument of development, not
an end in itself."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1993, passage by the United States
Congress of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)2-once considered a relative certainty-hinged
precariously on the efforts of President Bill Clinton to respond
to clamorous opposition to the pact waged by U.S. labor and
environmental organizations.3 U.S. labor unions decried the
threat to U.S. manufacturing jobs posed by a free trade area
within the United States, Mexico, and Canada, asserting that
NAFTA would prompt U.S. and Canadian companies to move
their manufacturing facilities to Mexico in order to take
* B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. The
author presently works in the Employment and Labor Law Division, Office of the
General Counsel, within the United States Department of Commerce. The opinions
expressed in this article do not represent the opinions or policy of the Department
of Commerce.
1. Cuauht~moc Cbrdenas, leader of El Partido Revolucionario Democrdtico,
quoted in Marci McDonald, Options to American Domination, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
15, 1993, at A27.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. According to one observer, "Not since the tariff battle of 1832-when
South Carolinians threatened secession-have Americans been as consumed by a
trade issue." John B. Judis, The Divide: History vs. NAFTA, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
11, 1993, at 26, 26. After NAFTA negotiations began in 1991, a Gallup poll found
83% of individuals expressing an opinion in favor of NAFTA. Id. at 32. By March
1993, 63% were opposed. Id.; see also Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric Griego, The
Labor Dimension of the NAFTA: Reflections on the First Year, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 473, 473 (1995) ("It is fair to say that no other trade policy initiative in
recent memory generated the degree of public attention and debate as the
prospects for free trade and investment flows in the North American continent.").
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advantage of inexpensive labor costs and unscrupulous
occupational health and safety standards.4 Wary of alienating
a major constituency,5 the Clinton Administration hailed the
adoption on August 13, 1993 of the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) as a partial antidote for these
concerns.7 The so-called "side agreement on labor" created a
mechanism through which member countries could monitor
and challenge the enforcement of each others' labor laws.'
Although insufficient to transform the opposition of U.S. labor
unions,' the side agreement on labor (along with a
concurrently adopted side agreement on the environment)"0
sufficed to ensure passage of NAFTA in the U.S. House of
Representatives on November 17, 1993" and by the U.S.
Senate three days later.'
The controversy in the United States over NAFTA's impact
4. See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty
Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INTL L. & POLY
117, 128-35 (1993) (reviewing role of trade unions and allied human rights
organizations in the public debate prior to passage of NAFTA); see also Keith
Bradsher, NAFTA Something to Offend Everyone, N.Y. TIMS, Nov. 14, 1993, § 1,
at 14; Peter T. Kilborn, Hailing Health Plan but Denouncing Trade Pact, Big
Labor is Heard Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at A21.
5. "Sure, [Clinton] wants the treaty ratified, but not if it means confronting
core constituency groups in the Democratic Party opposed to NAFTA, such as
organized labor." Fred Barnes, The Insider: White House Watch, NEW REPUBUC,
Oct. 25, 1993, at 11, 11.
6. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, done Sept. 14, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]. NAALC entered into force on
January 1, 1994. See 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b) (1994).
7. See Warren Christopher, Statement on NAFTA Supplemental Agreements,
Aug. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File.
8. For detailed discussions of the procedural underpinnings of the side
agreement on labor, see Perez-Lopez & Griego, supra note 3, at 507-16; Michael J.
McGuinness, Recent Development, The Protection of Labor Rights in North
America: A Commentary on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,
30 STAN. J. INVL L. 579, 582-90 (1994).
9. See Bradsher, supra note 4, at 14 (U.S. labor unions objected to the lack
of penalties within NAALC for violations of industrial relations law and to the
cumbersome nature of NAALC process).
10. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, done Sept. 14,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480. This agreement also entered into force on
January 1, 1994. See 19 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1994).
11. H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (enacted). The House approved the
bill on a recorded vote of 234-200. 139 CONG. REC. D1323 (daily ed. Nov. 17,
1993).
12. The Senate approved the bill on a recorded vote of 61-38. 139 CONG. REC.
D1356 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
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on U.S. jobs largely ignored a simultaneous discussion in
Mexico regarding the desirability of the agreement. 3 On the
one hand, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari vigorously
promoted NAFTA as a crucial component of the economic
reforms he had fostered since taking office in 1988, which also
included vast privatization efforts, curbing of deficit spending,
and closer relations with the United States. 4  The
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), which, as
Mexico's largest labor organization, historically has been
closely tethered to Mexico's long-powerful El Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), also strongly supported
NAFTA." In contrast, El Partido Revolucionario Democrdtico
(PRD), the principal opposition party to the PRI, opposed
NAFTA in favor of enacting a Continental Trade and
Development Pact, which would have created a European-style
Social Charter, Social Fund, and Court of Justice to stimulate
trade and promote North American solidarity.16 Among other
13. "The approval of the labor side agreement was determined more by the
economic and political needs that existed in the United States than by pressures
exercised by diverse trade union and human rights organizations in Mexico."
Manuel Fuentes Mufiiz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and Its
Repercussions for Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT L. 379, 399 (1995); see also Betty
Southard Murphy, NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: The
Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403, 405 (1995).
14. Tim Golden, In Mexico, NAFTA Isn't Just About Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1993, § 4, at 3; see also Peter Seybold, The Politics of Free Trade: The Global
Marketplace as a Closet Dictator, MONTHLY REV., Dec. 1995, at 43, 46 (U.S.
dealings with the Salinas administration included the extension of lines of credit
in the amounts of $3.5 billion, $825 million, and $325 million in 1988, 1989, and
1992, respectively).
15. Latin American Institute, U.S. Labor Union A.F.L.-C.LO. Asks Labor
Secretariat for Permit to Establish Office in Mexico City, SOURCEMEX ECONOMIC
NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEXICO, Sept. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Srcmex File.
16. McGuinness, supra note 8, at 580 & n.3. The European Union (EU) has
created an integrated labor policy and law, resulting from the concern that
European companies choosing to invest in less-developed EU regions, such as
Spain and Italy, would force workers throughout Europe to accept lower labor
standards in order to remain competitive. Id. at 590-91. The EU has harmonized
national labor standards "under the rubric of Community law, the development of
the judicial doctrines of supremacy and pre-emption for conflicts between national
and Community legislation, and the strengthening of 'infringement proceedings'
against nations in violation of Community obligations." Id. at 591. Specifically, in
the late 1980s, 11 of the then 12 European Community nations (all but the
United Kingdom) approved the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
of Workers (Social Charter), which lists the "Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers," including "occupational health and safety protections, guarantees for the
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goals, anti-PRI activists sought stronger assurances than those
found in NAFTA that the next century would not increase the
pressures on the Mexican government to forego vigorous
enforcement of worker protections in exchange for unfettered
private investment.'7 This agenda for development in Mexico,
however, which asked more from northern countries than the
mere proliferation of their industries, found no place in the
U.S. dialogue regarding NAFTA. U.S. supporters of free trade
instead focused on the belief that "[tihe future of a stable,
responsible, pro-American government" in Mexico depended on
the enactment of NAFTA.5 Opponents voiced only token
interest in the welfare of Mexican workers, fastening their
discourse instead on potential job loss in the United States.19
In the emerging era of free trade, Mexico shares a
quandary of development with poorer nations all over the
world. Undoubtedly, the future of development lies less in the
traditional arena of international loans and grants projects, to
which wealthier nations have diminished their commitment in
recent years,20 and more in the globalization of trade, through
right to organize and bargain collectively, rights to adequate social welfare
benefits, workplace consultation and participation rights, and protections for
children, older workers, and the disabled." Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and
the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 987, 1001 (1995). The Social Fund aspires "to provide vocational
training and resettlement allowances for displaced workers, and to enable workers
to be geographically and occupationally mobile." Id. at 1000. The European Court
of Justice ensures that Member States observe Community Law, including labor
provisions therein, pursuant to their commitment under the European treaties. See
McGuinness, supra note 8, at 592.
17. Although in the late 1980s the PRD nearly handed the PRI its first defeat
in 70 years, this opposition party led by Cuauhtdmoc Cdrdenas, see supra note 1,
thereafter experienced a decline into virtual irrelevance. Michael Stott, Opposition
Chief Says Mexico's Zedillo Doomed to Fail, Reuters, May 10, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Cbrdenas blames the deterioration of his
party's influence on PRI-sponsored murders of 400 PRD activists over the past
decade. Id.
18. Golden, supra note 14, at 3. Because NAFTA represented the most
important policy initiative of former Mexican President Salinas at the time,
NAFTA supporters in the U.S. argued that failure of the pact to be passed by the
U.S. Congress would result in serious political uncertainty in Mexico. Id. In
addition, it was argued that failure to pass NAFTA would result in devaluation of
the peso. Id. Ironically, Mexico suffered a grave peso devaluation crisis in 1994,
notwithstanding the implementation of NAFTA on January 1 of that year. See
Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric Labor Rights
Policy Under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INt' L. 337, 362-64 (1995).
19. See Bradsher, supra note 4, at 14.
20. See Judis, supra note 3, at 32 ("NAFTA may not be the best way to help
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which private corporations channel resources to under-
developed nations for the unabashed purpose of profit
maximization. The pressure on underdeveloped nations to
choose between proliferation of foreign industry and virtual
international abandonment has never been greater; as a result,
considerable incentive has grown for poor countries to
surrender their commitment to their own regulatory
objectives-including ideals of industrial labor relations-to
the anti-regulatory demands of potential foreign investors.
Where, as in Mexico, a government must choose between
enforcing its legal commitment to fair labor practices and the
competing demands of foreign investors offering employment to
a multitude of the nation's low-skilled, underemployed
workers, the choice most often proves to be the "sadder but
wiser" one. After all, it has been reasoned, labor law itself
becomes meaningless in the absence of jobs.2' The
globalization of trade thus has incited a world-wide "race for
the bottom," which refers to both the pursuit of capital to areas
with lower regulatory standards, as well as to the incentive for
all countries to adjust their regulatory environment to a scale
that is attractive to foreign companies.' It has been
remarked further that the globalization of trade typically hurts
domestic labor movements, both in developed countries and
underdeveloped countries.'
This paper asserts that, notwithstanding the pressures on
Mexico to nourish foreign investment while abandoning
enforcement of its constitutional commitment to protect the
rights of Mexican workers, significant potential remains for the
realization through trade of Mexico's "home grown" vision of its
own development as embodied in its labor law. Part II of this
paper examines the progressive vision of labor rights and
management-worker relationships found in Mexican labor law
and the corresponding paucity of the law's enforcement. Part
III reviews the recent surge of attention to the notion of
international labor standards, considering the various interests
behind this movement and the coinciding resistance to
Mexico-some critics argue for huge development loans-but its the only way that
the American public will remotely accept.").
21. Stone, supra note 16, at 992; see id. at 992-94.
22. Id. at 992; see also Compa, supra note 18, at 356.
23. Stone, supra note 16, at 990.
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standards raised by developing countries. Part IV explores
how, in the context of NAFTA, purportedly good intentions of
standards proponents do not necessarily align with the
development concerns of Mexican workers; in particular,
NAFTA's side agreement on labor advances those international
standards most likely to benefit the protectionist interests of
U.S. and Canadian workers, while neglecting the two "core"
labor standards that most directly enable Mexican workers to
participate in the determination of the course of their nation's
development-namely, freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining. Part V concludes that bolstered emphasis
on association and bargaining rights through NAALC can
ultimately support the quest of Mexico's independent labor
unions to achieve a meaningful role for workers in charting the
economic destiny of their country.
II. MEXICAN LABOR LAW: AN UNREALIZED BLUEPRINT FOR
DEVELOPMENT
A. Aspirations of Social Equality
Mexico presents a unique case study of the intersection
between trade policy and international development, two
disciplines that, until recently, have remained virtual
strangers from one another.' In particular, as an instrument
24. Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under
the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INTVL L. 439,
439 (1995). The intersection of trade and development first received significant
attention at the 1972 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
which established a Working Group of government representatives to draw up a
draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Adopted in 1974, the
Charter sets forth a variety of principles, including the Fundamentals of
International Economic Relations (Chapter I), the Economic Rights and Duties of
States (Chapter II), and the Common Responsibilities Towards the International
Community (Chapter M). The central principle espoused by the Charter appears
to be that of self-determination in the context of international trade. For example,
article 1 of the Charter states that "[elvery State has the sovereign and
inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and
cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside
interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever." Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31, at 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CERDS]. In
addition, CERDS provides that "each State has the right and the responsibility to
choose its means and goals of development, fully to mobilize and use its resources,
to implement progressive economic and social reforms and to ensure the full
participation of its people in the process and benefits of development." Id. art. 7.
366 [Vol. XXII:2
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that "marries" the economies of two advanced industrial
powers and one underdeveloped nation, NAFTA will instruct
development professionals for years to come about the impact
of such "mix and match" free trade areas on the economies of
their less developed member(s).25 A review of Mexico's long-
established labor law reveals a constitutional and statutory
infrastructure that, if vigorously enforced, envisions Mexican
workers as full participants in and beneficiaries of their
nation's progress. Contrived as a means of compensating
workers through law for their relative lack of power in the
market, Mexico's modern labor law represents the "strong link"
in the development ambitions of Mexican workers; indeed, a
uniquely Mexican vision of development emerges from the
nation's labor law.
An "astounding collection" of statutes, regulations and
policies exists in Mexico for the purpose of protecting the
collective bargaining and other employment rights of Mexican
workers." In fact, Mexico was the first country to incorporate
basic labor protection into its constitution 7 and now has some
of the strongest labor laws in the world." Enacted at the
25. See Garvey, supra note 24, at 442. He notes:
Because NAFTA established Mexico as the Third World partner in the
first major free trade agreement for a free trade area otherwise made up
of highly developed nations, the question about enforcement [of the labor
and environmental side agreements] has great significance beyond
NAFTA, involving the global future of free trade.
Id.
26. Ann M. Bartow, The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11 COMOP. LAB. L.J. 182,
182 (1990).
27. CONSTITUCION POLfTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST.] art.
123, reprinted in Mexico, in 12 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
97 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds., Ginsberg H. Flanz & Louise Moreno trans.,
1988); see HARRY K. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO: LAWs AND POLICIES
283, 285-86 (1971). In fact, organized labor played a significant role in Mexico's
revolutionary movement beginning in the 1900s. In 1906, organized labor aligned
with the Mexican Liberal Party to launch a series of strikes and, in 1915,
Mexico's dominant labor organization pledged to fight with President Carranza's
Constitutional Army in exchange for the government's commitment to enact labor
laws designed to protect workers' rights. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, The
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A New Frontier in North
American Labor Relations, 10 CONN. J. INT' L. 533, 541-42 (1995). These early
alliances mark "the beginning of the long-lasting and current Mexican practice of
making support for the dominant political force a requirement for official
government recognition of the labor movement." Id. at 542.
28. Shawna O'Grady, Doing Business in Mexico: The Human Resources
Challenges, BUS. Q. (Can.), Autumn 1995, at 43, 53.
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conclusion of the Mexican Revolution, the 1917 constitution set
forth "broad standards for the protection of the laboring class,
at a time when no labor movement of importance existed,"
including principles relating to hours of work, rest days and
vacations, minimum wages and other benefits, occupational
safety, discharge of workers, collective bargaining, strikes, and
dispute settlement.29 Article 123 of the constitution mandates,
inter alia, an eight-hour work day,3" a seven-hour shift for
night work,3 ' a maximum work week of six days, 2
mandatory childbirth and maternity leave,3 equal pay for
equal work,' and a mandatory minimum wage "to be fixed by
a national commission composed of representatives of workers,
employers, and the government .... ,3 Mexican workers also
share with employers the right to organize and represent their
respective interests by forming unions or professional
associations, and employee strikes are lawful "when they have
as their purpose the attaining of an equilibrium among the
various factors of production ..... 6 Without question, article
123 constitutes "a remarkable statement of social goals." 7
Moreover, Mexico's statutory law, including that enacted by
29. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 285. In 1929, the constitution was amended to
give exclusive legislative jurisdiction in labor matters to the Federal Congress. Id.
at 285-86.
30. CONST. art. 123(A)(I).
31. Id. art. 123(A)(II).
32. Id. art. 123(A)(1V).
33. Id. art. 123(A)(V).
34. Id. art. 123(A)(VII).
35. Id. art. 123(A)(VI), para. 3; see Bartow, supra note 26, at 183. In fact,
U.S. and Canadian companies initiating business ventures in Mexico find that
mandatory employment benefits alone add 30% to 40% of their basic payroll costs.
O'Grady, supra note 28, at 52. For example, a typical compensation package for
an unskilled Mexican laborer includes:
A mandatory Christmas bonus equivalent to a month's salary, 10% of the
company's pretax profits, contributions to a mandatory government
retirement savings plan, eight statutory holidays, double-time after 48
hours, a 25% premium for Sunday work, the right to a permanent job
once an employee is past the 30-day probationary period, a six-day
vacation with two additional days for each year up to a maximum of 24
days, training for workers, 12 weeks of paid maternity leave and the
right to return to work, and a 5% payroll contribution to the Federal
Workers' Housing Fund.
Id.
36. CONST. art. 123(A)CXVIII); Bartow, supra note 26, at 184-85.
37. Bartow, supra note 26, at 188.
368
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the Federal Labor Act of 1970 (Ley Federal del Trabajo),
provides even greater support for the procedural and
substantive rights of Mexican workers."8
The objective of Mexican labor law, it has been observed,
is to establish and preserve a balance between the extra-legal
power and influence of capital and the rights of the nation's
workers.39 Substantively and procedurally, Mexico's labor law
generally grants workers the upper hand,4 in purported
compensation for the "negative impacts they experience as a
result of the 'free exercise of the right of ownership."'4 This
legal framework, which aspires not necessarily to favor
Mexican workers, but to place them "in the same bargaining
position as their employers,"4 in fact reflects Mexico's
cultural and historical preference for "a consensus-building
inclusionary dynamic, rather than the adversarial politics of
other latitudes.'
Mexican labor law further incorporates other values
inherent in Mexican culture. For example, the law supports
the immense cultural commitment to the family in Mexico"
through provisions providing for mandatory childbirth and
maternity leave (six weeks prior to the approximate date of
childbirth and six weeks after the child is born),45 as well as
through strong protections of job security.46 Similarly, the law
38. Id.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id. at 190.
41. Id. at 189 (quoting Del Castillo, Mexico, in 7 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29 (R. Blanpain ed.,
1979)). "It appears that the purpose of defining labor law so broadly was to
extend its reach to every aspect of labor relations, thereby providing a mechanism
to neutralize the impact of market forces upon workers to the greatest extent
possible." Id. at 191.
42. Id. at 189.
43. Lucy Conger, Mexico: The Failed Fiesta, CURRENT HIST., Mar. 1995, at
102, 106. For an interesting discussion of this conflict-averse dynamic as it arises
within foreign management of employee relations, see generally O'Grady, supra
note 28.
44. See O'Grady, supra note 28, at 48.
45. Bartow, supra note 26, at 183.
46. Id. at 187. A labor relationship with an "innocent" employee may be
terminated only as a result of mutual consent, termination of contracted work,
mental or physical disability of the worker, or a closing down of the company. In
addition, when a company is sold, the new employer assumes the conditions and
duration of any existing labor agreement. Id.
1996] 369
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appears to anticipate problems that may arise through the
cultural norm of strict workplace hierarchy.47 Although the
law does not purport to eliminate hierarchical norms, it
attempts to compensate for potential abuses by establishing a
plethora of rights that might not otherwise be granted by
powerful employers.
The breadth and substance of Mexico's labor protections
may indeed be regarded as an agenda for development. In
short, the theory behind Mexican labor law-that "the law
must intervene on the side of the worker in order to equalize
the labor-management relationship"4--constitutes a "home
grown" vision of social justice about which both trade and
development professionals should be conscious and respectful.
Moreover, the precise elucidation of expectations within
Mexican labor law means that foreign governments and
corporations can hardly assert that the agenda of Mexico's
workers has never been expressed.
B. Mexico's "Crisis of Non-Compliance"9
It is, of course, the practical operation of Mexico's labor
law that has fueled anti-NAFTA sentiment among various
groups within all three member countries."0 Notwithstanding
the profound statement of ideals found within Mexico's
constitution and statutory law, the labor law historically has
47. See O'Grady, supra note 28, at 44, 51.
48. Muffiz, supra note 13, at 384.
49. Mohan G. Gopal, Law and Development: Towards a Pluralist Vision 6
(Mar. 28, 1996) (unpublished paper presented at the American Society of
International Law Annual Meeting, Panel on Law and Development, on file with
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (attributing the "crisis of non-
compliance" to laws within underdeveloped countries to, inter alia, the over-
emphasis by development professionals on Western legal models at the expense of
internal legal traditions which, though often informal and unwritten, carry far
greater compliance than the "modern law").
50. In particular, U.S. and Canadian unions denounce the apparent migration
of manufacturing jobs to a country where the strength of the labor laws is
negated by their underenforcement, as well as the corresponding dilution of wages
and standards within northern industry in order to remain competitive. Garvey,
supra note 24, at 442 ("The principal complaint about Mexico has been not its
lack of [worker safety and] health and environmental laws, but the lack of
enforcement of its laws and the related endemic corruption of its legal system.").
Conversely, some Mexicans object to their government's abandonment of its
historically protective functions for a system in which labor rights are not
permitted to interfere with foreign investment. See Mufiiz, supra note 13, at 385.
370 [Vol. XXHI:2
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operated as a means of confining concerted activity by Mexican
workers and preserving union support for the PRI.5" Since
organized labor played a central role in its rise to power in
1928, the PRI has maintained a close alliance with Mexico's
major labor unions, promoting and protecting generations of
labor leaders in exchange for the faithful support of Mexican
union membership.52 Although the primary beneficiary of
government favor has been CTM, which as Mexico's largest
union consists of sixty to seventy percent of Mexico's eight
million unionized workers, the government periodically shifts
its support to other labor organizations (or even to other
political sectors), thereby encouraging or undermining CTM's
authority as circumstances dictate." Accordingly, in the
interest of maintaining favor with the government, CTM and
the other government-endorsed unions54 participate in a
system of spoils for union leaders, offering stable and
prestigious government positions to those union leaders who
cooperate with the party.55 This system results in a structure
of union administration that detaches labor leaders, both
physically and figuratively, from the workers they purport to
represent. Corruption of union officials is endemic; one report
estimates that union leaders earn $750 million each year by
using their public positions to extract bribes and payoffs from
management, contractors, and public officials. 5
In order to sustain the influence of government authority
within a few, PRI-friendly labor organizations, Mexican law
requires all unions to "register," a formality without which
51. Amy H. Goldin, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of
Democracy in Trade Unions, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 203, 203-04 (1990).
52. Id. at 203; see Jorge G. Castafieda, Mexico's Circle of Misery, FOREIGN
AFF., July-Aug. 1996, at 92, 101 (After Mexico's Revolution of 1910, "[t]he union
bureaucracy traded independence and activism for a limited welfare state, job
security, and its very survival.").
53. Id. at 207-08; see also Bierman & Gely, supra note 27, at 543.
54. In 1966, CTM united with other government-endorsed labor confederations
to form an umbrella group of the PRIs labor sector, called the Congress of Labor
(Congreso del Trabajo), which ostensibly was created to work for the common goals
of Mexican workers. Goldin, supra note 51, at 208. Encompassing about 90 percent
of unionized workers in Mexico, Congreso del Trabajo in fact "serves not the
unions but rather the PR. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 209.
56. Id. at 210 (citing Sergio Sarmiento, Union Goons Gut Mexico's Ailing Oil
Industry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 21).
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they are unable to sign contracts, obtain property, or, indeed,
provide meaningful representation to their membership. 7
"Not only must workers [in independent unions] confront the
employer and the entrenched official union," according to one
Mexican commentator, "they must also contend with the labor
law authorities that do everything possible to delay or deny
recognition to a dissident local union even where a majority of
workers want it.""5 The discrimination against independent
unions begins with routine discharge by employers of union
organizers 9 and the concurrent unwillingness of the
government to enforce the constitutional prohibition of
interference with the right to organize." Moreover, the right
to strike, although defended in principle by article 123,1 has
been undermined by various notification procedures, which
include mandatory attempts at conciliation, that must be
observed in order for a strike to be legal.62
The enduring alliance between the government and
Mexico's most powerful unions results in scant enforcement of
Mexican labor law, particularly within facilities owned by
foreign investors. For example, both compliance with and
enforcement of Mexico's various labor laws have been
extensively criticized with respect to the maquiladoras, the
foreign-owned manufacturing plants existing chiefly along
Mexico's northern border." A 1993 U.S. General Accounting
57. Muiz, supra note 13, at 386; see also Goldin, supra note 51, at 211 &
n.39; Bierman & Gely, supra note 27, at 548.
58. Mufliz, supra note 13, at 387.
59. See, e.g., Sebastian Rotella, Worker Vote Tests Rights in Mexico, L.A
TIMES (San Fernando Valley ed.), Dec. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
60. Article 123 of Mexico's constitution sets forth the rights of both workers
and employers to organize for the defense of their respective interests by forming
unions or professional associations. CONST. art. 123(A)(XVI); see Bartow, supra note
26, at 184.
61. See CONST. art. 123(A)(XVII-(X).
62. Bierman & Gely, supra note 27, at 548.
63. Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between
Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 CONP. LAB. L.J. 226, 226-27 (1990).
The maquiladora industry was formally established in 1965 under Mexico's Border
Industrialization Program. Maquiladoras: Industry Will Be Transformed by NAFTA,
MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Sept. 1994, at 8. Beginning that year with 12 plants, the
program grew to include over 2200 plants and 541,200 workers by the end of
1993. Maquiladoras: Production up 19 Percent, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., May 1994,
at 22; see also Maquiladoras: Industry Will Be Transformed by NAFTA, supra, at
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Office (GAO) study of worker health and safety at eight U.S.
owned maquiladora auto parts plants found that, although the
United States and Mexico have similar laws protecting
workers, Mexico is significantly less aggressive in protecting
its low-skilled workers from ergonomic hazards." In addition,
the study found that the U.S.-owned plants at issue typically
lacked hazard-specific training programs, provided inadequate
Spanish-language safety warnings, and posed various
unchecked noise and chemical hazards.65 Moreover, although
the GAO reported that the U.S. parent companies of the plants
each "said that their corporatewide policy was to provide a
healthy and safe work environment for all employees,"" the
report suggested that the companies' efforts at compliance with
health, and safety standards in Mexico are in fact significantly
less diligent than their compliance with comparable standards
within the United States. 7
One author explains that the Mexican government's
interest in foreign investment, and its supposed benefits,
uniformly outweighs its concern for enforcing its own labor
laws:
The Mexican government views the maquiladora
program as a way to transfer technology to Mexican industry,
to upgrade workers' skills, improve employment and income
in the border area, and to increase demand for Mexican
goods.... [However,] [mlaquila workers are not well served
by labor regulation in Mexico. In fact, while maquila
industries are formally subject to the "labor protective and
defensive" legislation first set out by the Mexican
8. The original Border Industrialization Program allowed foreign materials and
components of production duty-free importation, regardless of their origin, as long
as the finished product was exported rather than sold on the domestic market. Id.
Under the tariff and import provisions introduced by NAFTA, the meaning of
maquiladora has changed to "indicate simply assembly-type operations with no
special customs or tariff privileges and conditions.. . ." Id.
64. Worker Health and Safety at Eight U.S.-Owned Maquiladora Auto Parts
Plants, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Jan. 1994, at 7-8, 27-31 (article based on the
report prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office). Ergonomics studies the
long-term physical impact on workers who perform repeated physical activities,
which is customary among the low-skilled jobs within the maquiladoras. See id. at
25-26, 31 n.6.
65. Id. at 24-26.
66. Id. at 27.
67. See id. at 27-28.
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Constitution of 1917, in practice, many aspects of the
legislation are seldom enforced-or indeed enforceable-in
foreign [owned] factories.... [Tihe maquildora [sic] boom has
created special difficulties for Mexican employees who have
little or no collective bargaining power: they do not seem to
benefit from statutorily mandated profit sharing; they do not
receive statutory compensation for layoffs, plant closings, and
work-related injuries; and, as northerners, they tend to be
politically alienated from the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional), the party which dominates Mexican politics.68
According to other observers, enforcement of Mexican labor
law in domestically-owned companies may be even worse.69
Indeed, rather than delivering on its promise to quell the ex-
cesses of hierarchy, Mexican labor law provides the setting for
continuous dealmaking and mutual gain for the PRI and labor
leaders. In light of the historical affiliation between the Mexi-
can government and Mexico's major unions, and, ultimately,
private industry," independent unions face extreme difficul-
ties not simply in organizing workers, but also in securing the
very right to exist. In exchange for law enforcement geared to
preserving the power of the CTM and other government-en-
dorsed unions, the government receives unremitting support
from the largest, most powerful labor organizations as well as
relative labor peace." Moreover, CTM acts in concert with the
government to quell independent labor activity, as evidenced
by CTM's cancellation of the traditional May Day celebration
in 1995 in an attempt to silence protests by small, independent
labor unions and other anti-establishment groups." CTM's
support for NAFTA seems particularly at odds with the aspira-
68. Peters, supra note 63, at 227 (footnotes omitted).
69. See, e.g., McGuinness, supra note 8, at 581 & n.10 (citing studies indicat-
ing that Mexican workers employed in U.S.-owned factories are healthier than
those employed in comparable domestic industries); see also WRIGHT, supra note
27, at 287 ("In the absence of a union, workers are likely to be ignorant of the
laws and procedures or lacking in sufficient power to enforce their rights, and
violations of the minimum wage and other requirements are regularly reported.").
70. "The employer actually substitutes for the union in all respects." Mufiz,
supra note 13, at 389.
71. See Harry Sterling, Labor Unrest A Symptom of Mexico's Growing Pains,
FIN. POST, May 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Finpst File.
72. Notwithstanding the official cancellation of the May Day festivities, 75,000-
100,000 workers "marched through the heart of Mexico City denouncing the CTM
and the government's policies ... ." Id.
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tions of Mexican labor law, given the Mexican government's
original opposition to any correlation between free trade and
labor rights.73 In light of the reciprocal benefits arising from
CTM's affiliation with the PRI, however, government-endorsed
union support for NAFTA is hardly surprising.
Thus, both external and internal factors share the respon-
sibility for the meager enforcement of labor law in Mexico. In
particular, the external factors consist of the government's cur-
rent preoccupation with encouraging foreign investment, along
with the "anti-labor and anti-union policies" brought to Mexico
by foreign investors.74 The internal factors chiefly include the
historical affiliation of union leadership with the PRI, resulting
in leaders who have proven more loyal to the PRI than to their
own membership, and the concurrent restraints on organiza-
tion of independent unions that could provide meaningful rep-
resentation to Mexican workers.
IH. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: CONFRONTING THE
"RACE TO THE BOTTOM"
As the major force fostering development in the next cen-
tury, the globalization of trade may also represent
development's most significant antagonist. World-wide retrac-
tion of trade barriers among nations allows multinational cor-
porations to open manufacturing facilities in nations where the
business conditions are the most favorable. Companies may
utilize low-cost labor and permissive health, safety, and envi-
ronmental standards to assemble their products as cheaply as
possible, then ship the products to customers without having to
pay trade-prohibiting tariffs. Globalization of trade therefore
presents the development community with a strategic dilem-
ma: Are workers in poor countries such as Mexico better
served by the implementation and enforcement of international
labor standards, which prescribe harmonious treatment of
laborers throughout the world, or by a "pluralist" approach to
trade and development that permits individual nations to iden-
tify their own economic priorities and workforce norms when
seeking to generate foreign investment? As discussed below,
aspects of both approaches warrant meaningful consideration
73. See infra Part W.A.
74. See Mufliz, supra note 13, at 379.
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on a regional and global level.
A. The Trade-Induced Movement Toward International Labor
Standards
Until recently, the notion of international labor standards
has remained the largely overlooked philosophical agenda of
the International Labor Organization (ILO).75 During the
course of its seventy-five-year history, the ILO has developed
over 170 conventions pertaining to labor and employment
rights, including the "human rights core" of six conventions
addressing freedom of association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, forced labor, child labor, discrimination,
and minimum acceptable conditions with respect to wages,
hours and workplace health and safety.76 Proponents of inter-
national standards contend that all nations must adhere to
certain principles of fair labor practice, that nations must be
held internationally accountable for failure to comply with the
core standards, and that multinational corporations must not
be permitted "to implement labor policies based solely upon the
laws of each nation where they operate, especially where laws
are designed to repress rather than protect workers, and pro-
vide a competitive edge in international trade."77
In the era of accelerated global trade and elimination of
trade barriers, international labor standards-particularly the
core standards-have emerged as a topic of renewed debate.
Chiefly, globalization of trade illuminates the empirical reality
that "differences in labor standards, worker organization, and
labor relations policies among countries at varying levels of
development become critical variables in trade and investment
decision making."7 Without question, international labor
standards serve the interests of anti-trade advocates in devel-
oped nations who seek to prevent the "export" of jobs to devel-
oping countries;79 standards can thereby be construed by crit-
ics as representing a flagrant attempt to deny developing na-
tions the trade advantages of low-cost labor.8 " On the other
75. See Compa, supra note 18, at 337.
76. Id. at 337 n.3 (citing INTL LAB. ORG., HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMION RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1988)),
77. Compa, supra note 4, at 117 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 120.
79. See Seybold, supra note 14, at 47-48.
80. See David Aaron, Labor Standards as a Universal Right, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
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hand, international standards also constitute a tactic of ad-
dressing genuine objections of nations and consumers to ob-
taining goods manufactured under conditions that they find
morally unacceptable, such as by indentured servitude or child
labor. Professor Compa further explains the dual interests
behind labor standards-trade linkage:
Working people in developed countries who have fought for
decades to achieve middle class living standards will not be
willingly driven back toward poverty in a global "race to the
bottom." In many poorer countries, the notion that employees
are happy to be exploited for the sake of development is one
proffered by the government and commercial elites, not by
workers and genuine trade union leaders. The premise of
labor rights advocates is a simple one: no country-and no
company operating in the country-should gain a competitive
advantage in global trade by killing union organizers, ban-
ning strikes, using prison labor or brutalized child labor, or
by purposely holding wages and conditions below levels com-
mensurate with workers' productivity with any elemental
social justice."'
Proponents of international labor standards thus assert
that universal norms constitute a necessary response to a
variety of trade-related problems, both for developed and un-
derdeveloped trading partners. In addition to the problems
inherent in a "race for the bottom," "the advent of trading
blocs, free-trading zones, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and other 'free-trade' reforms" removes the "legal restrictions
on capital's ability to flow to locations which generate the high-
est returns at the lowest factor costs." 2 Accordingly, unless
capital confronts the same general labor standards in all coun-
tries-including not only wage requirements, but also genuine
association and collective bargaining rights and worker health
and safety standards-the ability of domestic labor organiza-
8, 1995, at 11 (permanent U.S. representative to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) ("Those who promote international labour
standards, such as the [United States], are often castigated as protectionists seek-
ing to impose minimum wages, minimum working hours or basic health and safety
standards on developing countries in an effort to deny them the trade advantages
of low-cost labour.").
81. Compa, supra note 18, at 338-39 (footnotes omitted).
82. Stone, supra note 16, at 992.
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tions in developed countries to counter the issue of runaway
shops is subverted.' In addition, in the absence of common
standards, labor unions in different nations are unable to work
together "in a way that jointly harnesses their economic weap-
ons and furthers their joint bargaining goals."' Rather, un-
ions from developed and underdeveloped countries are forced
to work against each others' interests, and, in fact, the unions
from underdeveloped countries are rewarded-through the
influx of jobs, at least-by inactivity.
International labor standards may be implemented
through a variety of measures, either multilateral or unilater-
al. The multilateral approach creates the possibility that, in
the future, international tribunals constructed for the enforce-
ment of labor standards will continue to develop, concurrent
with the emergence of an international labor movement.'
Presently, the European Union (EU) has constructed one of the
world's strongest multilateral models to establish and enforce
international labor standards: first, preemptive EU legislation
mandates that citizens of each member state abide by certain
treaty provisions and r~glements, and, second, EU directives
and other various incentives exist for member states to "har-
monize" their labor and employment laws with a common set
of norms.8 6 As discussed in Part IV, NAFTA's side agreement
on labor, which establishes an international mechanism
through which the United States, Canada, and Mexico can
challenge the domestic enforcement of each other's labor laws,
also constitutes a multilateral approach to implementation of
international labor standards.87 In addition to these methods
that generally leave enforcement of shared standards up to
83. Id. at 990-92. "Companies that can freely and costlessly relocate to low-
wage areas are unlikely to accede to union demands for higher wages or improved
working conditions." Id. at 991.
84. Id. at 995.
85. At this time, the notion that labor standards may be effectively promul-
gated and enforced on an international level is considered "a bit rosy-eyed," given
the absence of multilateral agencies authorized with the power of enforcement as
well as the fact that there are "no serious cross-border labor organizations which
can engage in multilateral bargaining." Id. at 998. Indeed, a global consensus in
support of international labor standards does not exist at this time. See discussion
infra Part HI.B.
86. Stone, supra note 16, at 998-1006; see also McGuinness, supra note 8, at
590-96.
87. See generally McGuinness, supra note 8.
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individual nations, pressure has increased on the WTO, con-
structed as an enforcement body of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to establish a permanent working
group to discuss the interrelationship between international
trade and workers' rights." In conjunction with this initiative,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has identified "core" labor standards similar to those
developed by the ILO, and currently promotes international
labor standards as a means of "raising living standards by
encouraging the fair distribution of gains from growth and
development." 9 The ILO similarly is working to develop mod-
els and mechanisms that may be adopted on an international
level to condition the benefits of free trade on the commitment
to basic labor standards.90
Alternatively, the United States in recent years has devel-
oped a series of unilateral methods to promote international
adherence to basic labor standards, including such methods as
preference programs, unfair trade policy, international econom-
ic policy, and linkage of foreign aid to observance of workers'
rights." For example, beginning in 1974, the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP)r2 has authorized the President to
grant duty-free treatment to eligible merchandise exports from
beneficiary developing countries. 3 Under GSP, the President
may consider countries eligible for such preferences only if
they have taken steps to afford internationally recognized
labor rights to their workers;" those rights designated by
GSP as "internationally recognized" include the right of associ-
88. See U.S. Encountering Stiff Opposition to Discussing Trade, Labor in WTO,
13 IN TRADE REP. (BNA) 472 (Mar. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Stiff Opposition].
89. Aaron, supra note 80, at 11.
90. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of International Labor Standards and
NAFTA: Retrospect and Prospects, 10 CONN. J. INTL L. 427, 445-48 (1995).
91. Id. at 430-39. For an exhaustive list of unilaterally-declared labor rights
provisions in U.S. trade laws, see Compa, supra note 18, at 340 n.14.
92. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994). The GSP was part of the overall Trade Act
of 1974. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1994).
93. 19 U.S.C. § 2461. The Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of
1984 extended the 10-year mandate of the original GSP for an additional eight
and one-half years. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 506(a), 98 Stat. 3000, 3023 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2465(a) (1994)); see Perez-Lopez, supra note 90, at 431.
The duty-free treatment provisions of § 2465(a) terminated, however, on July 31,
1995, and as of September 1996 the GSP has not been renewed.
94. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7).
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ation, the right to bargain collectively, a prohibition against
forced labor, a minimum age for employment of children, and
"acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health." 5 In addi-
tion, section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 furnishes the
authority of the President to deny or restrict access to U.S.
markets, as well as to retaliate against foreign government
acts, policies or practices that are deemed unreasonable or
unfair.96 Although section 301 has not yet been wielded as re-
dress for violation of international labor standards, it is viewed
as implicating U.S. Trade Representative action against coun-
tries that fail to follow internationally accepted labor stan-
dards.97 Other unilateral U.S. policies promoting basic labor
standards include the Caribbean Basin Initiative," which con-
ditions the granting of trade preferences to twenty-seven coun-
tries or territories within the Caribbean Basin region on vari-
ous criteria, including adequate "steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights,"99 and a statutory mandate that the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) restrict its
development assistance to nations that are "taking steps to
adopt and implement laws that extend internationally recog-
nized worker rights ... to workers in that country. . .."0
For proponents of international standards, both the multi-
95. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4)(A)-(E).
96. Pub. L. No. 93-617, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (1994)).
97. International Trade and Social Welfare: The New Agenda, 17 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 338, 343 (1996) (transcript of Jan. 7, 1995 meeting of the section on Interna-
tional Law of the American Association of Law Schools) (remarks of Frederick M.
Abbott); see also Perez-Lopez, supra note 90, at 434-35.
98. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (1994).
99. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7).
100. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1994). Created as part of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2430i (1994), OPIC aspires "[to mobilize and facili-
tate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic
and social development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in
transition from nonmarket to market economies, thereby complementing the devel-
opment assistance objectives of the United States . . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 2191. The
OPIC labor rights clause "led to the removal from OPIC insurance coverage for
U.S. corporate investments in China, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea." Compa,
supra note 18, at 344 (citing James M. Zimmerman, The Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation and Worker Rights: The Loss of Role Models for Employment




lateral and unilateral approaches have advantages and disad-
vantages. The unilateral initiative by one country to condition
positive economic treatment-in the arenas of both trade and
direct development assistance-offers the practical advantages
of relative speed and effectiveness of implementation, and
avoids criticism by domestic detractors who feel threatened by
multilateral activity that purportedly compromises state sover-
eignty. In addition, enforcement mechanisms for unilateral
actions generally already exist, thereby avoiding the need to
construct new procedures or tribunals.
On the other hand, although unilateral promotion of labor
standards may be extolled as one nation's virtuous statement
of principles and expectations-in the absence of which it will
not trade-unilateralism has been widely criticized as an impe-
rious method of dictating cultural norms to other nations,
shrouding protectionist motives in edicts of moral righteous-
ness.'' In contrast, multilateral initiatives toward interna-
tional labor standards carry the additional authority of consen-
sus. Although encumbered by the complexities of achieving
international agreement on common issues, as well as con-
structing methods of international enforcement, multilateral
approaches nonetheless offer the various advantages inherent
in "teamwork." This includes the opportunity for affected na-
tions to participate in the delineation of standards, contribut-
ing their own economic concerns and cultural norms to the
dialogue and ultimate determination of which standards shall
be accepted and enforced. As discussed below, however, there
does not exist an international consensus regarding the desir-
ability of labor standards, for important reasons that stan-
dards proponents must strive to comprehend and address.
B. Pluralist Objections to International Labor Standards
Notwithstanding newly energized discussion of interna-
tional labor standards, surprisingly little attention has been
paid to parallels between trade as an avenue of development
and the traditional approaches to development, such as pro-
grams supported by international lending institutions and for-
eign aid. Significantly, the lessons of traditional law and devel-
101. Compa, supra note 18, at 345-48 (discussing criticisms against and argu-
ments in favor of unilateral promotion of international labor standards).
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opment instruct that international advocacy of a single set of
legal norms-that is, Western-oriented models of law, at the
exclusion of traditional and customary law-has been a fail-
ure. °2 The law-and-development "pluralists" charge that con-
ventional avenues of modernization over-emphasize the West-
ern value of individualism, at the expense of traditional sourc-
es of communal authority, such as those found in families and
ancient community relationships."°3 Consequently, it is ar-
gued, the "modern law," typically based on cultural and social
values of the West, lacks authority in the underdeveloped
nations where it is imposed, and a "crisis of non-compliance"
results where the externally imposed norms constitute "a dis-
tant phenomenon in largely illiterate societies that do not
attribute the same cultural sanctity to written communication
as Western traditions do .... "' According to Professor
Gopal,
[Tihe law and development movement must shed its imperial
compulsions. It should disassociate itself with the effort...
to use law as an instrument of social change. Instead, the law
and development movement should set as its main objective
the protection of the freedom of States and people to choose
their social and cultural norms and values (including their
legal systems) in accordance with rules of international law.
Its main commitment should be to freedom of choice of eco-
nomic, political, social and cultural systems as guaranteed in
international law. It should not be the vehicle for promotion
of any particular set of national cultural and social norms.
Rather, it should be committed to the freedom of States and
people to choose the laws by which they are governed."°5
Thus, the pluralist argument calls for close empirical
study of underdeveloped countries prior to recommending legal
reforms, as well as incorporation of traditional sources of au-
thority, including the historic roles of family and community,
into all legal structures."6 According to the pluralists, pro-
102. See Gopal, supra note 49, at 1-4 (citing Michael M. Cernea, The
Sociologist's Approach to Sustainable Development, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1993, at 11-
13).
103. Gopal, supra note 49, at 1.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). In general, this view reflects the priorities
enunciated in CERDS, discussed supra note 24.
106. Gopal, supra note 49, at 8-10. In recent years, according to Professor
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posed legal reforms in a developing country should be ground-
ed not in the intervenor's view about what policy is best, but in
the priorities identified by the country's various interested
groups. The pluralist approach specifically eschews dictation
by developed countries and international lending institutions of
what the best interests of an underdeveloped country are and
the procedures it should follow to achieve those interests."7
In the absence of the pluralist approach, according to its propo-
nents, increased lawlessness and violence, as well as declining
social integrity and order, will permeate the world's underde-
veloped nations."' 8
The pluralist concerns that originate in traditional ap-
proaches to law and development also arise in the debate over
linkage of international labor standards to world trade.0 9 For
example, in the course of debate within the ILO regarding
trade-labor standards linkage, one representative of a Paid-
stani corporation has argued that the preexisting commitment
within GATT's preamble to raising world-wide standards of liv-
ing-without mention of encumbering "social" provisions re-
garding environment, labor, or human rights-"leaves no room
for creating new obligations" such as a specific commitment to
core labor standards."0 The chief argument voiced against
ILO support for conditioning trade on adherence to interna-
Gopal, the World Bank has embraced various aspects of this approach, including
the following "lessons" of law and development: (1) each country needs to make a
clear choice about the direction of legal reform; (2) each country should prioritize
its reform needs to reflect the particular circumstances of that country; (3) for
legal technical assistance to bring about desired results, the recipient governments
need to demonstrate a clear commitment to legal reform and take full ownership
of the legal reform process; (4) broad participation of local lawyers is important, as
is the need to include local lawyers as advisors and diversify the source of foreign
advisors in a way that best assists the country's chosen path of legal reforms; and
(5) training included in legal technical assistance must be adjusted to local condi-
tions. Id. at 2.
107. See Compa, supra note 4, at 120 & n.13 (citing instances in which orga-
nized labor movements in underdeveloped countries have resisted austerity and
privatization measures imposed on their governments by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and other global lending agencies).
108. Gopal, supra note 49, at 1.
109. See, e.g., Stiff Opposition, supra note 88, at 473.
110. Fasihul Karim Siddiqui, Ramifications of "Social Clause" in International
Trade Agreements, ECON. REV., Apr. 1995 (Pak.), available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File (derived from paper presented at United Nations sponsored
conference regarding labor standards).
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tional labor standards is that such standards may prove incon-
sistent with the "stage of social and economic development
attained by" less developed nations."' Consequently, it is ar-
gued, including such standards "may [be] tantamount to im-
peding the fundamental and sovereign right of freedom in
trade available to member states."" Other concerns include
the potential conflict between internationally imposed labor
standards and constitutional protections within certain na-
tions, such as Pakistan, that prohibit most types of govern-
mental restraints on trade."' In addition, the concern re-
mains that developing countries will be the object of "'aggres-
sive unilateralism' in the name of promoting workers' right[s]
[which] will thus impede the process of economic growth and
full employment as an outcome of trade liberalisation ef-
forts.""4
In order to gain support beyond their established base of
developed nations, proponents of international labor standards
must thoroughly consider and respond to the pluralist concerns
raised by developing nations. After all, the proposition that
international standards will benefit working people everywhere
proves less compelling if only wealthy, industrial nations sup-
port their enactment. A dilemma remains: Should those coun-
tries that object to such norms as the pervasive use of child
labor found in Pakistan,"5 wages for shoe assemblers of sev-
enteen cents an hour in Indonesia," or the suppression of
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. According to Siddiqui:
Inclusion of any social clause as a condition precedent for liberalisation of
trade will impose an obligation on the part of the government to initiate
enactments which may not only be in restraint of trade thus impeaching
the constitutional guarantee available to citizens but will also be void for
being inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights.
Id.
114. Id.; see also Garvey, supra note 24, at 441 (explaining the historical man-
date of GATT as that of unequivocal promotion of international trade, with only
nominal consideration for linkage between trade and health, environment, and
labor regulation).
115. See Jonathan Silvers, Child Labor in Pakistan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb.
1996, at 79, 79 (notwithstanding recent laws passed in Pakistan that greatly limit
child labor and indentured servitude, laws are universally ignored and 11 million
children, age four to fourteen, work in Pakistani factories that often have "brutal
and squalid conditions").
116. Jefferson Morley & Robert Dorrell, A Kathie Lee Shopping Spree?, WASH.
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independent unions in Mexico" 7 act to construct and main-
tain trade barriers against countries practicing those norms?
Or should developed countries refrain from using trade as a
means of imposing their cultural values and protectionist con-
cerns on nations that sustain vastly different economies and
subscribe to dissimilar cultural norms, in observance of the
pluralist concerns discussed above?
Preliminarily, developed nations that strive to promote
international standards should be cognizant of how such initia-
tives may be perceived in poorer countries to which the edicts
of labor correctness are directed, and the long-term harms
resulting from these perceptions. First, the movement toward
international labor standards may be regarded as nothing less
than an attack on cultural norms within certain developing
nations, thereby legitimizing and perpetuating the notion that
"developed" values are necessarily superior to "underdevel-
oped" values."' Promotion of international standards casts
developing nations in a role of constant defensiveness, in which
they must continuously summon their scant resources to ex-
plain and justify their practices to a hostile international audi-
ence that extends less and less equanimity to cultural differ-
ences among trading partners. Accordingly, notwithstanding
the apparent intentions of standards proponents, the under-
mining of non-Western values and the imbalance of authority
on the world stage may be perpetuated.
Second, as Professor Gopal warned, "A social reform agen-
da designed and managed by people who assume no risk in the
endeavor, and have little accountability for its failures and
successes, is undemocratic and authoritarian," and, ultimately,
ineffectual."' Indeed, developed nations harboring practices
that certain developing nations may find abhorrent-such as
workplace restrictions on religious expression, or institutional
disregard for family concerns-simply do not confront the same
POST, May 12, 1996, at C5 (identifying sources of products sold by numerous U.S.
clothing retailers operating under conditions that likely do not conform with "core
international labor standards, an issue attracting attention when television talk-
show host Kathie Lee Gifford was reported to sponsor a clothing line produced by
workers, sometimes children, making thirty cents an hour in Honduras).
117. See Goldin, supra note 51, at 210.
118. See Gopal, supra note 49, at 4.
119. Id. at 3-4.
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international pressure to change their norms. If the notion of
international standards means that only "Western" standards
receive international endorsement, such standards lack persua-
siveness and authority. Accordingly, when they are enforced
without regard for the economic, political, social, and cultural
systems on which they are imposed, international labor stan-
dards face probable failure.
Third, and most importantly, promotion of international
labor standards as a condition for free trade directly threatens
the very means through which developing countries aspire to
achieve economic growth. After all, the process of eliminating
culturally ingrained aspects of industry within certain develop-
ing nations-such as widespread use of child labor or un-
healthy factory environments-itself may require an impetus
that is economic, rather than moral or trade-imposed. Specifi-
cally, without capital derived from international trade, edicts
that factories must refuse to hire children or comply with cer-
tain ergonomic standards will almost certainly be disregarded
as practical impossibilities. Standards proponents must under-
stand that conditions of work often turn not on the preferences
of developing societies, but on the availability of resources. In
the absence of continued foreign investment and trade, chang-
es in working conditions may simply be unattainable.
Although each of these problems must be understood and
addressed, they do not result in the necessary conclusion that
the movement toward international labor standards must be
abandoned. Rather, pluralist opponents of international labor
standards must recognize certain realities that justify the
advancement of standards.
First, to the extent that developing nations wish to ground
their future development in international trade, they must
understand that certain cultural sacrifices may be inevitable.
Trade entails not merely the transaction of goods, but also an
exchange of cultural and societal norms.2 ' Thus, developing
120. For example, as recently portrayed by National Geographic, trade between
Mexico and the United States results in the blending of cultures:
As on no other international border on earth, the First and Third
Worlds mingle [along the Rio Grande], each with something to tantalize
the other, each with its entrepreneurs keenly attentive to the shifting
prices, laws and enforcement practices on the other side.
... Whether or not either side likes it, America is being
Mexicanized by immigrants (salsa now outsells catsup in the United
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nations can hardly expect barrier-free import of their goods to
occur without commensurate expectations; although they are
not required by any means to abandon certain norms and pro-
mote certain others, such cultural changes may constitute the
logical price of participating in the global marketplace.
Second, pluralists should recognize that international
labor standards represent not simply a method of dictating the
conduct of governments and individuals, but also a legitimate
attempt to prevent excesses and abuses by multinational cor-
porations that open manufacturing facilities in developing
nations. In addition to harming workers in nations that lose
jobs to cheaper labor markets, these corporations also have the
potential to perpetuate working conditions that neither devel-
oped nations nor the developing host countries themselves find
acceptable.'21 Rather than dictating the "superiority" of West-
ern values, international standards may be viewed as repre-
senting a global initiative to prevent Western corporations
from prolonging abuses that governments of Western countries
do not condone and that individual governments may be un-
able to extinguish themselves.
Finally, developing nations should reconsider the long-
term ramifications of opposing advancement of the "core" inter-
national labor standards in the name of state sovereignty or
economic development. As argued by one proponent, the core
standards represent principles that most developed and devel-
oping nations already support, and "[clountries that deny these
basic rights to their workforce artificially hold down living
standards and restrict the benefits of trade to a narrow
elite."'22 In particular, governments that obstruct free associ-
ation and collective bargaining rights simply lack credibility if
they argue that their practices represent the cultural will of
their own people. Regardless of whether trade shall be used in
the future as a means of enforcing international labor stan-
dards, developing nations that refuse to practice the core stan-
dards are destined to face international scorn in other arenas.
States), and Mexico is being Americanized by commercial competition and
mass culture.
Richard Conniff, Tex Mex: The Winding Border Along the Rio Grande Both Divides
and Unites Two Fast-Changing Worlds, NATL GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1996, at 44, 50.
121. See Morley & Dorrell, supra note 116, at C5.
122. Aaron, supra note 80, at 11.
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For example, they may lose out on foreign aid or the economic
benefits of tourism. Accordingly, acceptance of and adherence
to the core standards may be regarded as a positive step to-
ward advancing, rather than confining, economic development.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, NAFTA AND MEXICO
The foregoing discussion of the international labor stan-
dards movement and the pluralist objections thereto bears
particular relevance to the regional labor issues confronting
members of NAFTA. NAFTA's side agreement on labor
(NAALC) represents the first occasion in which a workers'
rights provision-that is, a multilateral commitment to the
enforcement of basic labor standards-has been included in
any international trade treaty to which the United States is a
party.' In addition, of the five regional trade agreements
within the Western Hemisphere,' NAALC sets forth the on-
ly explicit multinational scheme for addressing labor is-
sues.' Thus, both as a revolutionary document that joins
the economies of one developing and two developed nations,
and as an example of multilateral linkage of trade to workers'
rights, the impact of NAFTA and NAALC on trade and devel-
opment will be examined for years to come. To date, U.S. insis-
tence on Mexican enforcement of certain labor standards has
been met by various sectors of Mexican society with an ambiv-
alence that reflects the general misgivings afforded interna-
tional labor standards by developing nations. In addition, be-
cause NAALC is structured to favor the interests of U.S. and
Canadian workers over those of Mexican workers-specifically,
by regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining
123. Murphy, supra note 13, at 406.
124. In addition to NAFTA, the four other "currently active subregional eco-
nomic integration arrangements" are, in chronological order: (1) the Central Ameri-
can Common Market (CACM) (including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica); (2) the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (including nu-
merous "very small, and very open, Caribbean economies"); (3) the Andean Pact
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela); and (4) the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR) (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Perez-Lopez,
supra note 90, at 462-66.
125. MERCOSUR includes a Working Group on Labor Relations, Employment,
and Social Security, through which labor matters are discussed. Id. at 467 (citing
Winston Fritch & Alexandre A. Tombini, The Mercosur: An Overview, in ECONOMIC




rights as "second-tier" standards-NAALC currently stops
short of its potential to enable meaningful participation of
Mexican workers in the advancement of their nation's econo-
my.
A. Pluralism in Mexico: What Have You Done For Us Lately?
In Mexico, skepticism over the general commitment of its
northern neighbors to meaningful enforcement of workers'
rights-both before and after the enactment of NAFTA and
NAALC-has been articulated both by pro-labor Mexican activ-
ists, who have little faith in the U.S. commitment to Mexico's
economic and social progress, and by government officials, who
perceive advancement of common labor standards as jeopardiz-
ing foreign investment and attenuating Mexican sovereignty.
On the labor side, distrust of the ability of the United States
and Canada to help solve the problems of Mexican workers
arises from the influx into Mexico of U.S. companies that con-
dition the promise of jobs on the veritable renunciation of labor
rights, as well as on the historic disinterest in Mexican devel-
opment exhibited by its northern neighbors. The Mexican gov-
ernment, for its part, objects to attempts by outside govern-
ments to compromise its sovereignty by dictating the enforce-
ment of labor law in Mexico and decelerating Mexican econom-
ic growth. Thus, on a regional level, Mexico shares the
pluralist apprehensions over universal standards articulated in
other international fora.
For example, Mexican labor attorney and law professor
Manuel Fuentes Mufiiz argues that, since even before NAFTA,
Mexican labor has been under assault from multinational
corporations that open manufacturing facilities in Mexico, then
proceed to impose working conditions that in many instances
blatantly and deliberately ignore Mexican law.'26 Under the
premise of "flexibilization,"'27 corporations institute such
practices, often found to the north of Mexico, as, inter alia,
abolishment and alteration of job descriptions; acceleration of
the pace and hours of production; employment of temporary
workers, part-time workers, and casual labor while eliminating
full-time, secure employment; abolition of seniority as the basis
126. Mufiz, supra note 13, at 380-81.
127. Id.
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of promotions and layoffs; and resistance of union organizing
campaigns through "illegal threats and promises." 23 Such ac-
tions not only violate the law in many instances, but they also
flout various cultural norms that exist in the Mexican
workplace. For example, although the institution of more effi-
cient work practices in Mexican factories may constitute "good
business sense" in the eyes of the U.S. or Canadian industrial-
ist, such action may occur without understanding of the cultur-
al norm in Mexico that is less hasty and time-sensitive than
that of the United States and Canada. 9 Similarly, manage-
ment practices that emphasize temporary or casual labor con-
flict with societal norms in Mexico that emphasize the impor-
tance of family, thereby resulting in a greater need for job
security and decreased mobility.' Where foreign corpora-
tions actively resist or even subtly discourage the organization
of labor, Mexican workers lose the fair chance to impress upon
their employers how business operations may successfully
incorporate these cultural norms.
Professor Mufiiz contends that the "anti-labor and anti-
union" policies brought to Mexico by foreign corporations re-
flect "similar employer-driven changes in employee and labor
relations in the United States" that, he further asserts, are
simply not welcome."' "The United States might think more
about setting a positive example of protecting workers' rights,"
he adds, "before telling other nations how to behave.""2 To
that end, Professor Mufiiz believes that multilateral involve-
ment in attempts to resolve the crisis in Mexican labor law
will not necessarily benefit Mexican workers. Rather, he con-
cludes, the problem "is one that working people [in Mexicol
themselves have to solve in the political and trade union mi-
lieu of Mexico.""
128. Id. at 381.
129. See generally O'Grady, supra note 28, at 45-46.
130. Id. at 48.
131. Mufiiz, supra note 13, at 381; see id. at 399. Professor Muiiiz specifically
decries such U.S. labor practices as worker replacement during strikes, alternative
dispute resolution methods that "are being foisted on employees to deprive them of
rights and remedies in the judicial system," threats of plant closure to discourage
union organizing drives, and the potential repeal of laws upholding wages of work-
ers under federal contracts. Id. at 383.




In fact, Mexican workers regard U.S. labor unions, and
their sudden interest in aligning with Mexican unions, with
similar misgivings."3 Mistrust of U.S. labor organizations
arises from the conflicting messages regarding NAFTA and
international trade that have emanated from U.S. unions over
the years. Specifically, notwithstanding their occasional state-
ments of "paternalistic concern for Mexican workers,"135 the
clear priority of U.S. unions throughout the NAFTA debate
was preservation of U.S. jobs, giving "proponents of NAFTA an
opportunity to label them as protectionist."' Indeed, the in-
terest periodically expressed by U.S. labor organizations in
cultivating a hemispheric or international labor movement
proves inconsistent with their historic tolerance of the belea-
guered status of independent unions in Mexico, while the sys-
tem of government-endorsed, ineffectual unions has
persisted."3 7 Moreover, in the midst of the 1994 Mexican peso
crisis, which resulted in a "$50 billion international rescue
package for Mexico orchestrated by the U.S. Treasury,"'
U.S. unions at once expressed sympathy with Mexican work-
ers, while they generally opposed the bailout.3 9 Even as
CTM suppressed worker protests arising from the peso crisis,
U.S. unions failed to join the remonstrations by human rights
coalitions, such as the Border Rights Project, and even "dis-
couraged local labor leaders from linking up to these coali-
tions." 4° Nonetheless, since NAALC entered into force, U.S.
unions have aligned with various Mexican interests, including
independent unions and the Mexican government, to formally
protest labor practices both in U.S. companies operating in
134. See, e.g., Latin American Institute, supra note 15 (attempt by AFL-CIO to
open office in Mexico City greeted with mix of opposition and support from both
government-endorsed and independent unions in Mexico).
135. Seybold, supra note 14, at 44.
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id. at 45. This tolerance is attributed to the historical confinement of
internationalism within U.S. unions to anti-communism, an interest shared by
Mexico's government-endorsed labor unions. "When the Cold War ended[,] the
leadership of the U.S. labor movement made minimal adjustments to its previous
stance on international issues." Id at 44.
138. Michael Prowse, The Rescuers: Why We Saved Mexico, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
27, 1995, at 11.
139. Seybold, supra note 14, at 45-46.
140. Id.
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Mexico' and in domestically operated U.S. companies.'42
Thus, although cooperative endeavors between U.S. and Mexi-
can labor groups appear destined to accelerate, they emerge
from the uneasy politics of necessity and opportunism, and
shall be received with fitting skepticism by Mexican workers
for the indefinite future.
For separate reasons, the Mexican government has proven
similarly wary of outsider attempts to prescribe specific stan-
dards and enforcement mechanisms for the country's labor law.
For example, during the NAFTA negotiations, anti-NAFTA
organizations (particularly U.S. unions) advocated various
means of achieving continental labor standards, in a transpar-
ent attempt to raise labor costs in Mexico to such a degree that
loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs would possibly be forestalled.'
Proposed tactics included U.S. intervention rights into Mexican
courts and edicts that the Mexican government "amend its own
legal system to ensure easier judicial review of administrative
action."' These external attempts to alter the conditions for
doing business in Mexico were regarded as a threat to the
Mexican government's own ambitions for development. Name-
ly, in the uncouth terms of one U.S. publication, "For Mexi-
cans, the one thing worse than being 'exploited' is not being
exploited." 45  Indeed, President Salinas grounded his
government's agenda for Mexican development in NAFTA,
selling the pact "assiduously to wary countrymen, promising
that only more jobs and better pay [could] come of it."' Ac-
141. For a detailed discussion of the first four complaints lodged under NAALC
against the Mexican government for alleged failure to enforce Mexican labor law
(each complaint specifically addressing free-association rights), see Bierman &
Gely, supra note 27, at 549-61; see also Mary Hull, U.S. Unions' New NAFTA
Strategy Strikes Out, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at 4.
142. Clay Chandler & Frank Swoboda, A Union Rehabilitates NAFTA, WASH.
POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at Cl; Carey Goldberg, U.S. Labor Making Use of Trade
Accord it Fiercely Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at All (U.S. labor unions
persuaded Mexican government to file a complaint under NAALC alleging U.S.
failure to enforce labor relations law against the Sprint Corporation, which pur-
portedly closed a subsidiary in San Francisco in the midst of unionization efforts
by the subsidiary's 200 Spanish-speaking female employees).
143. See Andrew Sullivan et al., For NAFTA, NEW REPuBLic, Oct. 11, 1993, at
7; Marshall J. Breger, Hitting Mexican Industry With NAFTA Rules, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1994, at 45.
144. Breger, supra note 143, at 45.
145. Sullivan et al., supra note 143, at 8 (emphasis added).
146. Golden, supra note 14, at 3.
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cordingly, due to both Mexican and Canadian opposition to so
intrusive a stratagem,'47 the final construction of NAALC
proved far less ambitious than that advocated by certain U.S.
interests.'" Nonetheless, the enactment of a side agreement
designed to secure certain shared rights of workers in
NAFTA's member countries occurred over the grave misgivings
of the Mexican government.
B. The Second-Tier Status of Association and Bargaining
Rights Within NAALC
In ultimately agreeing to the enactment of NAALC, the
Mexican government entered into a scheme devised not to
establish specific standards or harmonize Mexico's domestic
labor standards with those of the United States and Canada,
but to impel all three nations to enforce their existing laws
that specifically align with the broad principles set forth in
NAALC's preamble and article one.' Namely, under
NAALC, the United States, Mexico, and Canada each agreed to
make a consistent effort to incorporate the following principles
into their own labor law and practices:
P Freedom of association and protection of the right to
organize;
1 The right to bargain collectively;
• The right to strike;
P Prohibition against forced labor;
P Labor protections for children and young persons;
P Minimum employment standards;
• Elimination of employment discrimination;
Equal pay for women and men;
Prevention of and compensation for occupational injuries and
illnesses; and
' Protection of migrant workers. 50
147. Mexican officials approved NAALC in August 1993 only "[aifter insisting
that they would never accept trade sanctions to enforce their environmental and
labor laws ... ." Id.
148. See Breger, supra note 143, at 45; see also supra Part III.B.
149. McGuinness, supra note 8, at 583; see NAALC, supra note 6, pmbl., 32
I.L.M. at 1502-03.
150. NAALC, supra note 6, Annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515; see id., pmbl., art. 1(b),
32 I.L.M. at 1502-03; McGuinness, supra note 8, at 583 n.17.
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In order to enforce these "moral" obligations.5' assumed
by the three NAFTA countries, NAALC relies chiefly on coop-
eration between the countries-specifically, "exchanges of in-
formation, technical assistance, and consultations."52 NAALC
further creates a series of procedures through which one mem-
ber country may call into question another's enforcement of its
laws relating to NAALC's central labor principles. Under
NAALC, each country has established a National Administra-
tive Office (NAO), which, as the initial point of contact between
intergovernmental agencies and other NAALC players, is
charged with receiving complaints pertaining to labor law
issues in the territorial domain of another party.5 3 After con-
sidering a complaint and determining that it falls within the
scope of NAALC, an NAO may then request a ministerial con-
sultation with the party at issue, while also notifying the third
party of the request."54 The consulting parties are then obli-
gated to make "every attempt to resolve the matter through
consultations... including through the exchange of sufficient
publicly available information to enable a full examination of
the matter."
55
If the ministerial consultations fail to resolve the matter, a
party may next request the establishment of an Evaluation
Committee of Experts (ECE),'56 which is charged with ana-
lyzing "patterns of practice by each Party in the enforcement of
its occupational safety and health or other technical standards
as they apply to the particular matter" first considered by the
NAO.'57 Comprised of three members possessing subject-mat-
ter expertise, the ECE is expected to study the complaint and
issue a draft report within 120 days of its formation."' Each
party may submit to the ECE written comments on the draft
report;'59 the ECE then has sixty days after presentation of
the draft report, unless otherwise designated, to file a complete
151. Murphy, supra note 13, at 408.
152. Perez-Lopez, supra note 90, at 450.
153. NAALC, supra note 6, arts. 15-16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507; see also Perez-Lopez
& Griego, supra note 3, at 508-09.
154. NAALO, supra note 6, arts. 21-22, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-08.
155. Id. art. 22(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
156. Id. art. 23(1).
157. Id. art. 23(2).
158. Id. art. 25(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1508-09.
159. Id. art. 25(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
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report.6 ' The ECE files its report with the Ministerial Coun-
cil of the tripartite Commission for Labor Cooperation (the
Council). The Commission, comprised of the Ministerial Coun-
cil and a Secretariat, is NAALC's highest institution, generally
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the agree-
ment and developing recommendations on its further elabora-
tion.16
1
With respect to most of the labor principles espoused by
NAALC, an ECE report constitutes the farthest extent to
which labor issues within a member country may be officially
scrutinized under NAALC. If, however, a complaint concerns
one of three issues--occupational safety and health, child la-
bor, or minimum wage technical requirements-any party may
proceed to a third level of recourse, namely, a second consulta-
tion with the party at issue regarding whether there has been
a "persistent pattern of failure" by that party to enforce its
pertinent labor standards.'62 If the consulting parties fail to
resolve the matter within sixty days of the delivery of the re-
quest for consultation, a special session of the Ministerial
Council may be requested, at which the Council may convene
technical advisors or working groups, resort to appropriate
dispute resolution procedures, and/or make recommendations,
"as may assist the consulting Parties to reach a mutually satis-
factory resolution to the dispute."63
If the issue is not resolved within sixty days after the
Council has convened, the Council may assemble an arbitral
panel to consider the matter,16 so long as the matter is
trade-related and covered by mutually recognized labor
laws. 16 5 The arbitral panel is then obliged to render findings
of fact; determine whether there has been a persistent pattern
of failure by the party complained against to effectively enforce
its occupational safety and health, child labor, or minimum
160. Id. art. 26(1).
161. Id. arts. 8-11, 32 I.L.M. at 1504-06. The Ministerial Council is comprised
of "labor ministers of the Parties or their designates." Id. art. 9(1), 32 I.L.M. at
1505. The Secretariat is an administrative body initially staffed with 15 people, id.
art. 12(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1506, and headed by an Executive Director, id. art. 12(1).
162. Id. art. 27(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
163. Id. art. 28(4).
164. Id. art. 29(1).
165. Id. art. 29(1)(a)-(b).
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wage technical requirements in a manner that is trade-related
and covered by mutually recognized labor laws; and, if such a
persistent pattern is found, issue recommendations for resolu-
tion of the dispute, "which normally shall be that the Party
complained against adopt and implement an action plan suffi-
cient to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement."' 6 Failure of
a party to fully implement the action plan recommended by the
arbitral panel, or a mutually agreed-upon action plan, could
lead to the imposition of a monetary enforcement assessment
of potentially millions of dollars.6 7
Thus, NAALC constitutes a multilateral scheme that pro-
motes adherence to certain "core" labor standards, through the
primary use of communicative and cooperative methods be-
tween nations, while also providing for substantive penalties in
rare situations. Indeed, the initial lack of support for NAALC
demonstrated by the Mexican government resulted in certain
features in the NAFTA side agreement that address the
pluralist concerns of developing countries. Specifically, unlike
some multilateral schemes, NAALC does not require any mem-
ber nation to change its laws, and NAALC's implementation
procedures rely chiefly on "consultative" methods. That is,
nations whose labor practices are challenged always have the
opportunity to articulate the legal, economic, social and/or
cultural reasons behind their actions.
However, as evidenced by the four complaints filed against
Mexico under NAALC since its entry into force-each alleging
that the Mexican government failed to enforce the law protect-
ing workers' rights to organize in factories owned by non-Mexi-
can corporations 68 --NAALC stops short of addressing the
issues that appear to confine most dramatically the participa-
tion of Mexican workers in national and international conver-
sations about their own nation's development-namely, limita-
tions in Mexico against free association and meaningful collec-
tive bargaining.'69 By neglecting to include the rights of asso-
ciation and collective bargaining among NAALC's "first-tier"
standards, the failure of which to enforce may ultimately re-
166. Id. art. 36(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 1511.
167. Id. art. 39(4)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1512; idU Annex 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1516; see
also Perez-Lopez, supra note 90, at 460-61.
168. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part II.B.
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sult in trade sanctions, NAALC tacitly accepts the clear intent
of Mexico's government to continue its suppression of indepen-
dent unions and other organizations that seek to challenge
Mexico's eighty-year tradition of government-controlled labor
relations. As stated otherwise by Professor Mufiiz:
By agreeing to these exclusions, [NAALCI negotiators left un-
touched what are in the long run the gravest threats to work-
ers under NAFTA: the continued denial of free choice of un-
ions and free collective bargaining to Mexican workers, and
the continued dominance of an official labor movement by a
government willing to hold labor costs below productivity
gains to lure business from the United States.17
Moreover, just as NAALC appears to underplay the "core"
rights of association and collective bargaining that represent
"the most effective means of empowering workers to realise the
gains from their labour," 7' the issues that most directly
threaten U.S. and Canadian workers-i.e., health, safety,
wage, and child labor conditions that may motivate multina-
tional corporations to move south--conspicuously receive "first-
tier" treatment in NAALC. This dichotomy unquestionably
substantiates the grievances of Professor Muffiz and other
Mexican activists who complain that promotion of internation-
al labor standards generally encompasses nothing more than
the protectionist agenda of developed nations masked in self-
righteous dogma. Although an escalation of support under
NAALC for genuine association rights in Mexico could ulti-
mately upset the interrelationship between the Mexican gov-
ernment and the unions that the country has traditionally
sustained, it is hard to imagine how Mexican workers would be
harmed by such an effect. Rather, they would finally be invited
to participate in the discussion of how Mexico can best achieve
the vision of development that is found in Mexico's labor law,
but that has yet to be truly achieved.
170. Muffiz, supra note 13, at 392.
171. Aaron, supra note 80, at 11.
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V. CONCLUSION: FREE TRADE IN MEXICO-AN INSTRUMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENT?
Thus far, this paper has discussed the labor law in Mexico
(strong in theory, ineffectual in practice), the movement toward
international labor standards and the pluralist objections
lodged against this movement, and the Western Hemisphere's
first attempt at a multilateral scheme promoting shared labor
standards among Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Giv-
en each of these considerations, the question remains: Does the
promulgation of regional labor standards through NAFTA
ultimately help or harm Mexican workers? Professor Mufiiz
regards this question with both skepticism and hope:
Mexico has good labor laws. It does not need to be lec-
tured by the United States about its labor laws, nor to have
the U.S. labor law model imported into Mexico....
On the other hand, those rights specified in the Consti-
tution and the Law are not being respected by employers or
enforced by the government of Mexico. What Mexico needs is
honest, effective enforcement of its labor laws by a Labor
Ministry committed to the rule of law and by an independent
judiciary-not... a conscious non-enforcement policy aimed
at pleasing multinational companies and foreign investors.
This is not a problem to be solved by intervention from
the North. It is one that working people themselves have to
solve in the political and trade union milieu of Mexico. If the
NAFTA labor side agreement creates more space for such
struggles to be carried, without violating Mexican sovereign-
ty, it can have a positive effect. If instead it put[s] pressure
on Mexico to eliminate its progressive labor laws to conform
more to the U.S. model of labor-management relations, it
should be resisted. 72
For a variety of reasons, NAALC may very well contribute
to the realization of the optimistic possibilities enunciated by
Professor Mufiiz. First, notwithstanding certain unwelcome
"American" labor practices imported to Mexico by U.S. compa-
nies,73 Mexico possesses within its legal infrastructure the
laws and the authority to enforce its historic, purely Mexican
view of labor relations. In other words, unlike certain other
172. Mufiz, supra note 13, at 399.
173. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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developing countries, Mexico is not vulnerable to the potential
import of foreign law, because it presently boasts one of the
most comprehensive labor laws in the world.
Second, even as "second-tier" labor priorities under
NAALC, freedom of association and collective bargaining rights
in Mexico have attained regional and international attention
by virtue of NAALC's complaint procedures. Given the in-
creased activity of independent unions in Mexico in recent
years,74 the Mexican government thus faces both domestic
and international pressure to receive the diversity of interests
within Mexican labor, rather than limiting its consideration of
worker interests to the contributions of the government-en-
dorsed unions over which the government commands ultimate
authority. Even in the name of sovereiglity, resistance of the
apparent will of the Mexican people can hardly be defended.
Third, to the extent that independent unions in Mexico
cannot count on support from their government, they can sure-
ly take advantage of the resources and increasing goodwill of
the governments and unions to the north. After all, regardless
of their self-interest, U.S. unions that file complaints under
NAALC on behalf of Mexican workers do not face the same
repercussions that dissident workers themselves face in Mexico
under present conditions. 75
Thus, the linkage of free trade in North America to adher-
ence to basic labor rights may very well contribute to the at-
tainment of the vision of labor rights and Mexican develop-
ment that is found in Mexico's labor law. For Mexico, trade
may indeed prove to be an instrument of development, not an
end in itself.
174. See Sterling, supra note 71, at 23; Rotella, supra note 59, at B9.
175. See Goldin, supra note 51, at 214-16 (discussing repression in Mexico of
influential union leaders).
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